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CONFIDENCES AND THE GOVERNMENT
LAWYER
ROBERT P. LAWRYt
At least since Philip Shuchman's 1968 polemic' on the propriety of
the former Canons of Ethics as a group moral code, the aptness of hav-
ing the same rules and standards govern the activities of all lawyers and
all lawyering jobs has been in question. Considerable differences exist
among the kinds of ethical problems encountered by lawyers doing
probate work or criminal work, negotiating a contract or trying a law
suit, practicing with a corporation, a government agency, a law firm or
on their own. The question is whether there ought to be different ethi-
cal rules and standards governing the behavior of lawyers, depending
on the type of legal problem involved, the type of client being served,
and the nature of the lawyer's practice. I believe the answer to that
question is clearly "yes." 2 Broad ethical principles have been espoused
without careful, differentiated rule drafting to reflect the true nature of
the problems lawyers encounter in practice. Thus, the fit is either awk-
ward or there is no fit at all.
I would not be misunderstood on the scope of the changes I be-
lieve necessary. There certainly is enough that is similar in lawyering
t Associate Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University; B.A. 1963, Fordham Uni-
versity; J.D. 1966, University of Pennsylvania.
1. Shuchman, Ethics and Legal Ethics: The Propriety of the Canons as a Group Moral Code,
37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 244 (1968). For a brief historical account of the origins of the former
Canons, see H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHIcs 23-24 (1953).
2. In distinguishing between lawyers who practiced with "big law firms" (BLFs) and the
"little lawyers" (LLs) of the world, Professor Shuchman made a similar point: "(1) [T]he activities
[of the two groups] are very different (2) but perhaps not enough so that different labels should be
used (3) yet quite enough so that there should be two sets of rules (4) which should be drawn by
the different groups." Shuehman, supra note 1, at 266. I do not subscribe to this category of
propositions. I simply agree with Shuchman that there are sufficiently different lawyering activi-
ties to warrant separate rules. For example, with respect to his fourth proposition, I think it would
be disastrous for each "special" group to draft the rules that apply to them. That would likely
result in selfishly conceived rules all around. What the profession needs is a wider range of people
assisting it in drafting its rules. Of course, we also need to have a good deal of input from each
special group in order to understand from the insider's perspective what the "real" problems are.
The Final Report of the Seventh Annual Chief Justice Earl Warren Conference on Advocacy
in the United States goes part of the way in endorsing the view expressed in the text. Recommen-
dation B states: "The Code of Professional Responsibility should be redrafted to incorporate
standards of conduct applicable to specialty fields within the practice of law." RoscoE POUND-
AMERICAN TRIAL LAWYER'S FOUNDATION, ETHICS AND ADVOCACY 10 (1978).
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under any set of circumstances to warrant many identical rules and
standards. If this were not so, it would be impossible to talk of lawyers
as having membership in a single profession.3 Nevertheless, I believe
those who draft the ethical rules and standards too often labor under
certain unconscious assumptions that tend to blur important distinc-
tions between lawyer and lawyer, law job and law job.4 These assump-
tions are based not only on historical anomalies,5 but are also
sometimes based on deeply-felt, if often unarticulated beliefs about the
nature of the adversary system 6 or about the nature of lawyering gener-
ally.7 These assumptions are often simply the result of a lack of ade-
quate conceptualization and rigorous thinking.
This article is an attempt to uncover one such assumption, embed-
ded deeply in many provisions of the present Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility, and to demonstrate how utterly impossible it is to utilize
the Code in attempting to deal with the serious problems many of those
same provisions were ostensibly designed to aid the lawyer in handling.
The assumption is that a lawyer's client is a "readily-identifiable-
human-being." I do not mean to suggest that the draftsmen of the pres-
ent Code were not aware of so-called "entity" representation.' What I
do mean is that this largely unconscious assumption guided the hands
of the draftsmen and currently produces wholly unworkable results in
too many very important instances. The context for the discussion of
this assumption is the perplexing problem of confidentiality for the
government lawyer. While being extremely concrete in addressing this
problem, even to the point of suggesting specific changes in the Code of
Professional Responsibility, my hope is that the larger issue of the in-
aptness of having a single set of ethical standards to govern all the vari-
ous roles that lawyers fulfill, will not be lost as Philip Shuchman's
similar point was lost in the promulgation of a new Code a scant year
3. See R. POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMEs 4-10 (1953).
4. For example, in discussing the advertising question nearly 10 years before Bates v. State
Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), Professor Shuchman exposed one long-standing assumption of the pro-
fession: "The assumption that a good reputation will produce the unsolicited recommendations of
others and lead to a satisfactory and stable practice may have been warranted sixty years ago, but
for most LLr in most urban areas, a neighborhood reputation is a meaningless thing, a chimera."
Shuchman, supra note I, at 253.
5. See H. DRINKER, supra note 1, at 210-15.
6. See, e.g., Frankel, From Pripate Fights TowardPub/ic Justice, 51 N.Y.U.L. REV. 516, 516-
22 (1976). Judge Frankel calls the adversary system "The Adam Smith System of Adjudication."
7. See, e.g., Curtis, The Ethics of4dpocacy, 4 STAN. L. REv. 3, 5 (1951). Curtis says that on
behalf of his client, a lawyer "is required to treat outsiders as if they were barbarians and
enemies."
8. See EC 5-18; ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 86 (1932).
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after the appearance of his important article.9
I
The draftsmen of the Code did recognize that the government law-
yer has Qbligations that differ from those of other lawyers. DR 7-103
specifically sets forth two rules that are to guide the government lawyer
involved in criminal matters: DR 7-103(A) requires that the govern-
ment lawyer not institute criminal charges unless those charges are su-
ported by probable cause; ° and DR 7-103(B) requires the government
lawyer to disclose favorable evidence to the criminal defendant.1'
These two provisions imply that the government lawyer has a duty to
"justice," or at least to "faimess,"12 that the ordinary lawyer does not
have. Indeed, the ethical considerations supporting these two provi-
sions expressly substantiate this implication. EC 7-13 states: "The re-
sponsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual
advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict."1 3 EC 7-14
states: "A government lawyer who has discretionary power relative to
litigation should refrain from instituting or continuing litigation that is
obviously unfair." Furthermore,
9. At the time he was writing, Shuchman predicted the new Code would be d'a vu.
Shuchman, supra note 1, at 248 n.10.
10. The ABA STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION (Approved Draft 1971) offer
some additional guidance on this problem in § 3.9, which has been interpreted by Professor Rich-
ard Uviller as meaning that a "prosecutor must abjure prosecution without probable cause, should
refuse to charge without a durable prima facie case, and may decline to proceed if the evidence
fails to satisfy him beyond a reasonable doubt." Uviller, The Virtuous Prosecutor in Quest of an
Ethical Standard- Guidancefrom theABA, 71 MicH. L. REV. 1145, 1156 (1973). For a view that
the prosecutor's duties are even higher than Uviller believes them to be, see M. FREEDMAN, LAW-
YERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 84-88 (1975).
11. This duty is closely connected to the due process requirements announced by the
Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). See also Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S.
786 (1972).
12. EC 7-13, -14.
13. The whole provision reads as follows:
The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his
duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict. This special duty exists because: (1) the
prosecutor represents the sovereign and therefore should use restraint in the discretion-
ary exercise of governmental powers, such as in the selection of cases to prosecute; (2)
during trial the prosecutor is not only an advocate but he also may make decisions nor-
mally made by an individual client, and those affecting the public interest should be fair
to all; and (3) in our system of criminal justice the accused is to be given the benefit of all
reasonable doubts. With respect to evidence and witnesses, the prosecutor has responsi-
bilities different from those of a lawyer in private practice: the prosecutor should make
timely disclosure to the defense of available evidence, known to him, that tends to negate
the guilt of the accused, mitigate the degree of the offense, or reduce the punishment.
Further, a prosecutor should not intentionally avoid pursuit of evidence merely because
he believes it will damage the prosecutor's case or aid the accused.
EC 7-13.
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A government lawyer in a civil action or administrative proceeding
has the responsibility to seek justice and to develop a full and fair
record, and he should not use his position or the economic power of
the government to harass parties or to bring about unjust settlements
or results.'
4
Although the ethical considerations are "aspirational in character"
and are not "mandatory," they do "represent the objectives toward
which every member of the profession should strive."' 5 Though the
problem is serious, it is not necessary to quarrel at this point with the
inconsistencies that plague the Code in its attempt to maintain this as-
pirational/mandatory distinction;' 6 it is sufficient to note the clear ref-
erences to different duties on the part of the government lawyer "from
that of the usual advocate."
The latter's duties are often considered to be exclusively discharge-
able on behalf of the client. Indeed, in Lord Brougham's ringing
words: "'An advocate, by the sacred duty which he owes his client,
knows, in the discharge of that office, but one person in the world,
THAT CLIENT AND NONE OTHER.' "1 7 Whether these words are
hyperbolic or not,' 8 they do represent another unconscious assumption,
14. The whole provision reads as follows:
A government lawyer who has discretionary power relative to litigation should re-
frain from instituting or continuing litigation that is obviously unfair. A government
lawyer not having such discretionary power who believes there is lack of merit in a
controversy submitted to him should so advise his superiors and recommend the avoid-
ance of unfair litigation. A government lawyer in a civil action or administrative pro-
ceeding has the responsibility to seekjustice and to develop a full and fair record, and he
should not use his position or the economic power of the government to harass parties or
to bring about unjust settlements or results.
EC 7-14.
15. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preliminary Statement.
16. As one noted commentator has put it:
The crucial division in the Code is between the Disciplinary Rules, the mandatory mini-
mum standards of conduct, and the Ethical Considerations, the aspirational objectives of
the profession. The fact is, however, that there is no such clear-cut division in the con-
tent and function of these two parts of the Code.
A. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 31 (1976).
17. Rogers, The Ethics of Advocacy, 15 LAW Q. REv. 259, 269 (1899) (quoting Lord
Brougham's speech in defense of Queen Caroline before the House of Lords in 1820). Lord
Brougham continued his declamation as follows:
"To save that client by all expedient means-to protect that client at all hazards and
costs to all others, and amongst others to himself-is the highest and most unquestioned
of his duties; and he must not regard the alarm, the suffering, the torment, the destruc-
tion, which he may bring upon any other. Nay, separating even the duties of a patriot
from those of an advocate, and casting them, if need be, to the wind, he must go on
reckless of consequences, if his fate it should unhappily be, to involve his country in
confusion for his client's protection."
Id.
18. Surely, they are often quoted as one measure of the lawyer's zeal for his client. Compare
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which is at the heart of the Code of Professional Responsibility: that
the world is composed of two groups, clients and noncients; that clients
are to be embraced and nonclients are to be kept at arm's length. 19
This simplistic assumption coupled with the assumption that the client
is a readily-identifiable-human-being leads to a perception of the law-
yer's role as "the hired gun." Whatever quarrels one may have with
my characterization of the duty of the usual advocate, it is clear that the
duty has never been perceived to be to "justice" or to "fairness," except
in an indirect or wholly derivative way.20 Nevertheless, it is to those
magnificent abstractions that the government lawyer is said to be di-
rectly obligated under the Code.
Not spelled out in the Code are the reasons for these higher duties
to "justice" and to "fairness." Hints, however, are given. EC 7-13
notes that the prosecutor "represents the sovereign and therefore
should use restraint in the discretionary exercise of governmental pow-
ers." There is also a reference to the need to be "fair to all" in matters
affecting the "public interest."'" Obviously, the government lawyer has
special responsibilities because he represents the "sovereign," which is
another way of saying "the public interest," for in the United States, an
axiom of our governmental structure is that the people are
cc 1122sovereign.
Another reference in the Code to differences between the govern-
ment lawyer and other lawyers is found in DR 9-101(B). That provi-
sion states: "A lawxyer shall not accept private employment in a matter
in which he had substantial responsibility while he was a public em-
ployee."23 In General Motors Corp. v. New York 24 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a former federal gov-
ernment lawyer, retained by the City of New York to assist in an anti-
trust action against GM, was disqualified from representing the City,
even though the federal government had no objection to the represen-
tation. Normally in matters involving merely private litigants, the
questions involved relate either to potential confficts of interest or to
Curtis, supra note 7, at 4-5, with S. THURMAN, E. PHILLIPS & E. CHEATHAM, CASES AND MATERI-
ALS ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION 280 (2d ed. 1970).
19. G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 45 (1978).
20. See Fuller & Randall, Professional Responsibili: Report of the Joint Conference, 44
A.B.A.J. 1159, 1161 (1958) (making classic case for proposition that if the lawyer does his partisan
job properly, "justice" will be done).
21. EC 7-13, quoted in note 13 supra.
22. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 18 (1977).
23. DR 9-101(B).
24. 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974).
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the possible disclosure of confidential information damaging to the for-
mer client. Moreover, the problem arises when a lawyer is involved in
a matter on the opposite side from his former client. Courts have
worked out a "substantially related" test to govern these cases. Under
that test, the court determines whether the subject matter of the present
case is substantially related to the matter the lawyer worked on for his
former client. If so, the lawyer is disqualified." This is normally a
prophylactic rule, so the question of the actual misuse of confidential
information is not made an issue.26 Of course, the lawyer is always
forbidden to use a confidence or secret of his client to the client's disad-
vantage.27 This latter prohibition obviously extends beyond the termi-
nation of the lawyer's actual employment by the client.28 But in
General Motors, none of those factors was involved. The case did not
involve side-switching; the federal government was not involved in the
litigation. Moreover, the Department of Justice gave an opinion that
the federal conflict of interest statute did not bar the lawyer's represen-
tation,29 and therefore gave its tacit approval to the undertaking. Nev-
ertheless, because the lawyer had worked on the same matter while in
the employ of the federal government, canon 9's directive "to avoid
even the appearance of professional impropriety" led the court to a
fairly literal reading30 of DR 9-101 (B) in order to prohibit the represen-
tation. The policy justification was traced to a 1931 ABA Committee
on Professional Ethics Opinion, which determined that such represen-
tation should be strictly prohibited, lest a government lawyer conduct
public business in a way that tempts him to seek private employment
either "to uphold or upset what he had done" as a government law-
yer.3' This prophylactic rule, depending as it does on "appearances,"
marks another difference in the Code's handling of the ethical responsi-
bilities of a government lawyer. Again, the standard is higher for the
government lawyer; and again, although the ethical considerations do
not explicity refer to the reasons why this standard is higher, it is not
25. The best statement of the rule is to be found in T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros.
Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265, 268-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
26. The classic case of the prophylactic application of the substantially related test is Emle
Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1973). But see City of Cleveland v. Cleveland
Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. Ohio), afdmem., 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 856 (1978) (recognizing some flexibility in application of test).
27. DR 4-101(B)(2).
28. EC 4-6.
29. See 501 F.2d at 642-43.
30. The word "private," for example, simply meant "private practice" for remuneration,
rather than the opposite of "public." See id. at 650.
31. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 37 (1931); see 501 F.2d at 649.
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unreasonable to assume that the obligations to justice and to the public
interest are operative in this situation, as they were in the cases under
the cited provisions of canon 7.32 Indeed, EC 7-13 and EC 7-14 seem to
reinforce DR 9-101(B).
Aside from DR 7-103 and DR 9-101, and their supporting ethical
considerations, the only other reference to government lawyers in the
Code of Professional Responsibility is under canon 8.11 Under DR 8-
101, a lawyer who "holds public office" is cautioned against using that
position to obtain special advantages "for himself or for a client."
Without belaboring the point, it seems obvious that these provisions
remind the government lawyer once again of his special duties to jus-
tice, fairness, and the public interest.
There are no further references in the Code to the special obliga-
tions of the government lawyer.34 This omission is indeed unfortunate,
for the most serious problem for the government lawyer is, therefore,
simply not addressed. For purposes of this article, it is sufficient to
state the problem as one of "confidentiality." In order to understand
the nature of the difficulties, however, the question of client-identity
must be examined first. It is regarding this question of client-identity
that the assumption that the client is a readily-identifiable-human-be-
ing shows its distorting influence.
II
I have argued elsewhere that the question "who is the client?" is
the wrong question to ask in addressing the central problems of profes-
sional responsibility for the government lawyer.35 The primary reason
this is the wrong question is that the answer to it does not automatically
answer other, separate questions of immense practical importance, not
the least of which is the question of confidentiality. Under the present
Code of Professional Responsibility, if the client can be identified as a
single human being, the answers to the following practical questions
are identical and can be automatically deduced from the mere identifi-
cation of the client: (1) Who shall the lawyer take directions from in
matters to be decided "by the client"?36 (2) Whose "interests" is the
32. See notes 10-22 and accompanying text supra.
33. EC 8-8; DR 8-101.
34. A provision such as EC 7-11 seems simply to refer to the substantive provisions in EC 7-
13 and EC 7-14, and therefore imposes no new obligations on the government lawyer.
35. Lawry, Who Is the Client ofthe Federal Government Lawyer? 4n 4nalysis ofthe Wrong
Question, - Fed. B.J. - (1979).
36. See notes 42-45 and accompanying text infra.
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lawyer trying to foster or protect?37 (3) Whose "confidences" is the
lawyer obliged to respect?3" There is but one person, one person's in-
terests and one person's confidences that need concern the lawyer.
For the government lawyer, however, the answer to each of these
three questions is not necessarily the same. Even within a single ques-
tion, the answer may differ from situation to situation. Under the
Code, there is no indication that the draftsmen were even aware of this
serious discrepancy. This unawareness has had the effect of making
many provisions of the Code inapplicable to government lawyers.
Among those provisions are all of canon 4, the confidentiality canon of
the Code. I believe the problem was created by the mysterious work-
ings of the client-as-readily-identifiable-human-being assumption. As
Hazard has stated in reference to the client-identity question: "The le-
gal profession's rules of ethics provide what is perhaps worse than no
guidance. Instead of saying how or on what grounds the question of
client identity is to be resolved, they assume it has somehow been
resolved ex ante."39 Because it is necessary to resolve the client-iden-
tity problem before provisions such as those relating to confidentiality
can be intelligently applied, the literature is replete with articles argu-
ing for one candidate or another.4' At least four plausible candidates
have emerged: (1) society or the public interest; (2) the government it-
self, viewed as a self-contained bureaucracy (the "state" as opposed to
"society"); (3) the agency or department of the government, considered
as a self-contained unit or entity; and (4) one or more officials of the
agency or department, considered in their official capacities.41 Exami-
nation reveals, however, that no matter which candidate is selected as
appropriate in the abstract, no consistent application of that choice is
possible under the Code. To support this argument, it is necessary to
examine the Code with respect to the three client-identity questions
previously listed. /
37. See notes 46-59 and accompanying text infra.
38. See notes 60-61 and accompanying text infra.
39. G. HAZARD, supra note 19, at 45 (1978).
40. See, e.g., Risher Speaks on Legal Ethics, Callsfor Decisions of "Conscience, "FoRUM, Jan.
1977, at I (newsletter of District of Columbia Chapter of Federal Bar Association); Debate on
Legal Ethics Continues, FORUM, Apr. 1977, at 3.
41. The "public interest" is referred to in EC 7-13; the "government" is clearly the client for
Hazard, G. HAZARD, supra note 19, at 54; "the agency and its officials" is the client for the Profes-
sional Ethics Committee of the Federal Bar Association, see notes 46-49 and accompanying text
infra. For interesting philosophical distinctions among terms like Society, the State and the Peo-
ple, see J. MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE 1-27 (1951).
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Question One: Who shall the lawyer take directions from in matters to
be decided "by the client"?
This question involves the client as "directing authority." EC 7-7
states the traditional position regarding lawyer-client relations in the
United States: "[With minor exceptions] the authority to make deci-
sions is exclusively that of the client and, if made within the framework
of the law, such decisions are binding on his lawyer." It is for the client
to decide whether to take a settlement offer, what plea to enter in a
criminal case, or whether an appeal should be taken.42 Who is the cli-
ent as directing authority for the government lawyer? In the day-to-
day course of business, the answer seems to be the lawyer's superior or
superiors within the agency or department. First of all, obedience to
superiors may be essential if the lawyer is to retain his job and protect
his possibilities for advancement. But it is not clear the lawyer ought to
accept his superior's decisions in the same way he clearly ought to ac-
cept the decisions of his private client. Under the Code, the govern-
ment lawyer is said to have obligations to justice that are different from
the usual advocate.43 As a public prosecutor, the lawyer may be re-
sponsible for making decisions "for the client," who is referred to
under EC 7-13 as the "sovereign."'  Under EC 7-14 "[a] government
lawyer who has discretionary power relative to litigation should refrain
from instituting or continuing litigation that is obviously unfair."
Moreover, even when he lacks discretionary power, a government law-
yer "who believes there is lack of merit in a controversy submitted to
him should so advise his superiors and recommend the avoidance of
unfair litigation.""' 5 But the particularizations of EC 7-13 and 7-14 are
not tied in any comprehensible way to the traditional statement in EC
7-7 concerning the right of the client to make decisions "binding" on
the lawyer. Some consistency could be maintained if the special obli-
gations contained in EC 7-13 and 7-14 were simply explained away as
not applicable whenever the lawyer's government superior directs him
to do something he considers unfair but that is legal. This is not only
unacceptable because it negates the specialness of the government law-
yer's obligations under the Code, but it is also contrary to the axiomatic
norm of canon 5: "A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Profes-
sional Judgment On Behalf Of A Client." EC 5-21 expounds on that
42. EC 7-7. The examples cited in the text are referred to as "typical."
43. EC 7-13, quoted in note 13 supra.
44. Id.
45. EC 7-14, quoted in note 14 supra.
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axiom as follows: "The desires of a third person will seldom adversely
affect a lawyer unless that person is in a position to exert strong eco-
nomic, political, or social pressures upon the lawyer. . . .A lawyer
subjected to outside pressures should make full disclosure to his client
*.,., " It is therefore critical to know who is the government lawyer's
client under EC 5-21, because only then will it be possible to determine
who is a "third person." Clearly the assumption is working here again:
there is an identifiable client, all others are potential "third persons,"
subjecting the lawyer to "outside pressures." But those pressures may
be coming, not from the outside, but from within. When the drafters of
the Code focused on these pressures, they recognized this problem, yet
they failed to do anything about the anomaly. EC 5-18 is the relevant
provision:
A lawyer employed or retained by a corporation or similar entity
owes his allegiance to the entity and not to a stockholder, director,
officer, employee, representative, or other person connected with the
entity. In advising the entity, a lawyer should keep paramount its
interests and his professional judgment should not be influenced by
the personal desires of any person or organization.
This is the sole reference in the Code to entity representation, and
not one of its examples is drawn from the world of government. Work-
ing with this provision by analogy, it would seem that to call the agency
official the client for purposes of answering the first question is not
clearly appropriate. Unlike the corporate lawyer, for whom it may fre-
quently be easiest merely to follow the orders of his corporate superiors
even though he knows they are not his client, the government lawyer
has an obligation to justice or fairness because he represents the sover-
eign. Thus, for the government lawyer, the answer to the first question
requires more than identification of a client. How much more may well
depend on the answers to questions two and three.
Question Two.- Whose interests is the lawyer trying to foster orprotect?
In an important opinion of the Federal Bar Association's Ethics
Committee, it was argued that the government lawyer is to serve "the
public interest sought to be served by the governmental organization of
which he is a part."4 6 Proceeding upon this policy statement, the Com-
mittee went on to declare that the agency or department was the gov-
ernment lawyer's client.4 7 The opinion was more complex than these
46. Professional Ethics Committee, Federal Bar Association, Opinion 73-1, 32 FED. B.J. 71,
72 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Professional Ethics Comm.].
47. Id.
ol. 57634
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statements indicate, and certainly more ambiguous in its practical anal-
ysis of the meaning of having the agency as a client. 8 Nevertheless,
one government attorney who is deeply involved in teaching profes-
sional responsibility to government lawyers, stated that the opinion
comes down "squarely on the side of the agency and its administrators
as the clients of the government attorney."
49
At some level of generality, that position makes good sense.
Working for the Environmental Protection Agency or the Department
of Agriculture, the government lawyer concentrates his attention upon
matters in a way that seems to foster or protect the interests of the envi-
ronment or of our nation's farmers, which have been given over to each
agency by legislation and administrative regulation. Each government
lawyer, however, has an additional obligation to justice and fairness. If
this devotion to the interest of the agency or department blinds the law-
yer to the larger public interest to which each public official should be
duty-bound, then the Federal Bar Association's position is too nar-
rowly conceived."
The Code is clear on how a lawyer who is working for a private
non-entity client is to handle cases in which other interests are in-
volved. For example, if a wealthy man named Rex Lear wants to disin-
herit his longtime favorite daughter, Cordelia, because she will not
profess her love for him in the same extravagant terms as her sisters,
Goneril and Regan, surely it is the lawyer's obligation to draft the will
as Lear wants it or else resign.' There is no third option; the client's
interests alone are the lawyer's responsibility, and the client himself is
conclusively presumed to be the proper judge of his own best inter-
ests. 2 Of course, the lawyer may try to change the client's mind when
the act is foolish or unjust; the lawyer may even have an obligation to
48. See Lawry, supra note 35, at -.
49. W. Robie, The Teaching of Professional Responsibility to Federal Government Attor-
neys: The Uneasy Perceptions (unpublished paper delivered at National Conference on Teaching
Professional Responsibility on Oct. 1, 1977). Robie is the Associate Director, Legal Education
Institute, U.S. Civil Service Commission.
50. The government lawyer is a "public official." See the remarks of Dean Redlich in ASS'N
OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LAWYER: THE
MURKY DIVIDE BETWEEN RIGHT AND WRONG 94 (W. Galston ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as THE
MURKY DIVIDE].
51. Richard Wasserstrom believes it is necessary to resign in such a case on moral grounds.
Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (1975). Monroe
Freedman argues that it is moral arrogance to substitute one's own opinion for that of the client's
in cases like that of Rex Lear. Freedman, Personal Responsibility in a Professional System, 27
CATH. U.L. REV. 191 (1978). Obviously, neither author questions the main point made in the text:
the lawyer either drafts the will as requested or he resigns. There is no third choice.
52. EC 7-8: "In the final analysis, however, the lawyer should always remember that the
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try to change the mind of a client like Rex Lear. 3 If Lear is adamant,
however, the lawyer drafts in accordance with the testator's wishes or
the lawyer resigns.
There are some who believe the identical lawyer-client relation-
ship exists between a government lawyer and the agency official who
gives him directions. Richard H. Kuh, former District Attorney for
New York County, has stated publicly his position on this matter: "If
there is a problem, you are bound by the ethics of the official for whom
you work, and if that is anathema to you, you hand in your resignation
and write a book."54 A longtime government lawyer, John Carlock,
put it this way:
The theory seemed to be that the lawyer ... had acquired some
duty ... to be the final arbiter of right and wrong. I cannot agree
with this philosophy .... I do not believe that the ritual of becom-
ing a member of the bar invests a government lawyer with a power of
life and death over the agency he serves. The agency head takes his
own oath of office, and he is also subject to the inscrutable forces of
public opinion. In carrying out his responsibility to decide policy,
the agency head looks to his lawyer's counseling as one of his strong-
est supports; but the lawyer's counsel can never usurp the decision
which must be made by the responsible head of the agency. 
5
Carlock also believed the choice is between compliance and
resignation. 6
But think of EC 5-18 once again. The lawyer's obligation is not to
the individual but to the entity. I remain unconvinced that the decision
of the official is the decision that conclusively determines the interests
the government lawyer must foster or protect. Former canon 15 even
contained an admonition against obeying the client's conscience rather
than one's own .5  How much more problematic is the case of obeying
the conscience of one who is not clearly the client? I am also uncon-
vinced that the particular "interest sought to be served by the govern-
mental organization of which he is a part"5 is the interest the
decision whether to forego legally available objectives or methods because of non-legal factors is
ultimately for the client and not for himself."
53. Id. "In assisting his client to reach a proper decision, it is often desirable for a lawyer to
point out those factors which may lead to a decision that is morally just as well as legally
permissible."
54. THE MURKY DIVIDE, supra note 50, at 111.
55. Carlock, The Lawyer in Government, in LISTEN To THE LEADERS IN LAW 255, 268-69
(1963).
56. Id.
57. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 15 provides in part: "He [the lawyer] must
obey his own conscience and not that of his client."
58. Professional Ethics Comm., supra note 46, at 72.
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government lawyer must foster and protect; nor is the interest even the
interest of the "government. '59 The interest that the government law-
yer labors for is the public interest. He is a public official, and the
public must be the lawyer's client for purposes of answering the second
question.
There is a sense, however, in which this answer is so abstract that it
becomes merely rhetorical. Only when one encounters the implications
of the answer to the third question dealing with confidentiality can the
complexity of the client-identity problem be brought to a sufficiently
concrete level to allow us to determine who is the government lawyer's
client.
Question Three.: fhose confidences is the government lawyer obliged to
resfpect?
If a government lawyer has an ethical disagreement with his supe-
rior or if he believes the superior is not acting in the public interest, to
whom may he turn for help or even for mere discussion of the prob-
lem? Under canon 4 of the Code, a lawyer may not reveal the confi-
dences or secrets of his client.60 Thus, the lawyer will first have to
know who his client is before he can answer this question. Obviously,
if the lawyer's client is an abstraction, an entity like a corporation or
the sovereign itself, the practical problem is who speaks for the corpo-
ration or for the sovereign for purposes of canon 4. To answer that the
head official of the agency is the client for a government attorney sim-
ply will not do. One example will immediately show why.
Under the express terms of canon 4, the lawyer may not disclose
past illegalities unless his client consents.6' But what if the agency de-
termines it is in the best interests of everyone not to disclose certain
past illegalities perpetrated by agency officials. Is the government law-
yer thus foreclosed from making that disclosure? Choosing the govern-
ment as the client raises the specter of cover-ups of governmental
wrongdoing. For what if the Attorney General concurs with the judg-
ment of the agency head? Or the President himself? Or the entire mat-
ter seems to get lost in an avalanche of red tape or paperwork? Is the
59. Certainly not if the "government" is considered the "state," a part of the body politic, "a
set of institutions combined into a topmost machine." See J. MARITAIN, supra note 41, at 12.
60. DR 4-101(B)(1).
61. There is an exception for future crimes, DR 4-101(C)(3), but not for past illegalities,
except in the specialized case of fraud, and then only if the information is not privileged. DR 7-
102(B)(1). For a discussion of the controversy surrounding DR 7-102(B)(1), see Lawry, Lying,
Confidentiality, and the Adversary System of Justice, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 653.
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government lawyer to be ethically bound by the Code of Professional
Responsibility to perpetual silence? If one wants the answer to be "no"
to this last question, then clearly the provisions of canon 4 must be
substantially revised to fit the unique circumstances in which the gov-
ernment lawyer finds himself.
Of course, one could call the public interest the client and be real-
istically done with confidentiality altogether. If the public interest were
the client, and the lawyer objected to a negotiating strategy or a trial
tactic determined by his superior to be useful or necessary in securing a
government contract or in winning a lawsuit, presumably nothing in
canon 4 would prevent the lawyer from phoning the other side or writ-
ing a letter to the Washington Post while the matter was still pending.
That alternative seems no more acceptable on its face than those that
declared the agency or the government to be the client. The problem is
that the conceptual apparatus of client and confidentiality simply does
not work for the government lawyer in canon 4 terms.
III
For those who ponder the question of confidentiality and the gov-
ernment lawyer, canon 4 poses no serious problem, because although
commentators still deal in the language of canon 4, it is effectively ig-
nored.62 It should not be forgotten, however, that government lawyers
remain bound by the Code operative in the jurisdiction where the law-
yer has bar membership.63 Ethically, canon 4 rules the lawyer in these
matters. The resulting confusions cannot be ignored.
In Federal Bar Opinion 73-1, the Ethics Committee of the Federal
Bar Association made a serious and thoughtful attempt to deal with the
problem raised by the incongruities of canon 4 and the realities of the
government lawyer's practice. Because of the tradition of treating
confidentiality as a concept directly allied to client-identity, however,
the Committee believed it necessary to answer the question "who is the
client?" before addressing the central question of confidentiality. The
answer was that the agency and its officers were the clients of the gov-
ernment lawyer. This answer meant that the relationship was a confi-
dential one.' The Committee then discussed specific kinds of conduct
by government officials, asking under what circumstances disclosures
62. See, e.g., THE MURKY DIVIDE, supra note 50, at 93-113; Professional Ethics Comm.,
supra note 46.
63. See W. Robie, supra note 49.
64. Professional Ethics Comm., supra note 46, at 72.
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of that conduct might be made, and to whom.65 Possible conduct by a
government official was divided into four categories: corruption; clear
illegalities with scienter; illegalities clear to the lawyer but subject to
reasonable differences of opinion; and gross negligence.66
These categories in no way correspond to the categories of conduct
included in the exceptions to canon 4's prohibitions against disclosing
confidences or secrets of the client.6 Under the strict terms of canon 4,
there would be no question that none of this past conduct could be
disclosed without the consent of the client. 68 If the agency and its offi-
cials are the client, therefore, confidences or secrets could not be dis-
closed without permission of the head of the agency. Of course, the
Committee did not analyze the question in those terms. It simply of-
fered a series of prudential statements, which ultimately came to this:
corruption and clear illegalities with scienter can always be disclosed,
at least to the Attorney General;69 possibly illegal and grossly negligent
conduct ordinarily need not be disclosed beyond the personnel of the
agency.7 ° Of course, one suspects that ordinarily the first two classes of
conduct will not have to be reported beyond the agency level either.
These are obviously prudential maxims, however. More care should be
given to the possibility that the lawyer may be wrong or "making a
mountain out of a molehill" in the second two classes of cases. In the
final analysis, however, the standard seems to be the same for all cate-
gories of conduct. The opinion states:
[Djisclosure beyond the confines of the agency or other law enforcing
or disciplinary authorities of the Government, is warranted only in
the case when the lawyer, as a reasonable and prudent man, con-
scious of his professional obligation of care, confidentiality and re-
sponsibility, concludes that these authorities have without good cause
failed in the performance of their own obligation to take remedial
65. Id. at 73-74.
66. Id. at 71. "Corrupt" was defined as "venal conduct in violation of law and duty." "Ille-
gal" conduct was divided into two categories. Category I was "[t]he willful or knowing disregard
of or breach of law, other than of a corrupt character." Category II was "considered to be that
about which the lawyer may hold a firm position as to its legality but which he nevertheless
recognizes is in an area subject to reasonable differences of professional opinion as to its legality."
"Grossly negligent" was said "not to lend itself to greater clarification than those words them-
selves indicate." Id. Presumably, "gross negligence" would be the "failure to exercise even slight
care." See W. PROSSER & Y. SMITH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 213 (3d ed. 1962).
67. Those categories are: (1) when clients consent; (2) when permitted under disciplinary
rules or required by law or court order, (3) when necessary to prevent future crimes by clients; and
(4) when necessary to collect a fee or defend oneself against accusations of wrongful conduct. DR
4-101(C).
68. See DR 4-101(B)(C).
69. Professional Ethics Comm., supra note 46, at 73.
70. Id. at 74.
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measures required in the public interest.71
In analyzing similar questions involving the government lawyer
and confidentiality, Dean Redlich arrived at conclusions almost identi-
cal to that of the Federal Bar Association's Ethics Committee in Opin-
ion 73-1.72 Redlich gave the following hypothetical: Suppose you
represent the City of New York, and you are questioning a police of-
ficer who allegedly drove negligently and injured a citizen. Although
the city charter states that the city lawyer serves as lawyer for the police
officer,73 there is no doubt, says Redlich, that the lawyer has an obliga-
tion to disclose the information received from the officer to his superi-
ors in order for those superiors to report it to the appropriate law
enforcement people. Moreover, if the report is not made by the superi-
ors to the appropriate law-enforcement people, the lawyer should make
it himself, going outside the chain of command to see that it is done.
And if nothing is done at the law-enforcement level? Redlich does not
specifically answer this question, but he clearly indicates his belief that
the lawyer as a public official has an "affirmative duty" to bring the
relevant information concerning the wrongdoing "to the attention of
someone who can do something about it."74 Redlich does believe there
is room for traditional ideas concerning confidentiality in cases in
which the government lawyer, in giving legal advice to an official, ex-
plains the strengths and weaknesses of possible positions. But respect-
ing wrongdoing on the part of an official, whether criminal or
noncriminal,75 Redlich sees "little if any room" for the operation of the
traditional confidentiality concept.7
6
Several important issues emerge from an examination of opinions
like those of the FBA's Ethics Committee and Dean Redlich. The cen-
tral question seems to be whether there should be bars of confidential-
ity placed between the lawyer and a potentially conflicting obligation to
disclose information he has received as a government lawyer indicating
that illegalities have occurred in the operations of the government. De-
pending on the answer to that question, a range of secondary issues
emerge.
If one believes strongly in confidentiality, the issues are: What are
the limits of confidentiality? Which officials are those with whom the
71. Id. at 74-75.
72. THE MURKY DIVIDE, supra note 50, at 95-97.
73. Id. at 95.
74. Id. at 97.
75. Id. at 96.
76. Id. at 97.
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lawyer has a confidential relationship? If one believes there should be
no final bar preventing the lawyer from ultimately disclosing such in-
formation, what rules or guidelines shall be established to deal with the
common sense notion that everything that is said or done within the
government should not become a matter of instantaneous public
knowledge? This issue is obviously part of a larger public policy issue,
most often connected with calls for "sunshine laws"77 or with interpre-
tations of the Freedom of Information Act.78 The question being dealt
with here, however, is narrower. It concerns the scope of ethical behav-
ior on the part of lawyers working for the government. It is possible
that government lawyers should not be bound by the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility at all, that the nature of their positions as public
officials places them outside (or perhaps above) the cares and concerns
of ordinary lawyers. The choice to release government lawyers from
the bonds of the Code should not be made, however, without pro-
longed and careful study.
In the interim, I would offer suggestions to amend the Code to deal
with the problems of the government lawyer that have been discussed
in this article. To do so, I must be candid about my policy choices. I
believe the government lawyer must never be prevented from disclos-
ing information he reasonably believes indicates that there have been
illegal acts committed that touch the public business.7 9 The lawyer
should not be required to disclose such information; he should simply
not be fettered by the Code of Responsibility if he chooses to disclose.
On the other hand, I believe matters of policy, including issues of jus-
tice and fairness, are for the appropriate government officials; so long
as no illegalities are involved, discussions and decisions made by offi-
cials are to be held in confidence by the lawyer. In order to defend
these choices, the underlying policy justification for confidentiality
must first be examined.
The modern policy justification for attorney-client confidentiality
is the same as that which justifies the attorney-client privilege: the fear
that there will be less freedom of communication from a client who is
77. See Note, The Federal "Government in the SunshineAct"A Public Access Compromise, 29
U. FLA. L. REV. 881 (1977).
78. See Cox, A Walk Through Section 552 of the Administrative Procedure Act: The Freedom
of Information Act; the Privacy Act; and the Government in the Sunshine Act, 46 U. CIN. L. REV.
969 (1977).
79. There seems to be widespread agreement on this point. See THE MURKY DIVIDE, supra
note 50, at 97; Schnapper, LegalEthics andthe Government Lawyer, 32 REc. A.B.N.Y.C. 649, 649-
50 (1977); Weinstein, Some Ethical and Political Problems ofa Government Attorney, 18 ME. L.
REV. 155, 160 (1966); Professional Ethics Comm., supra note 46. But see Carlock supra note 55.
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not certain his lawyer will be bound to silence and who may therefore
be reluctant to risk being harmed by a subsequent disclosure.8" It has
been argued that there is less justification for this policy in entity repre-
sentation than in personal representation.8 The protection offered by
the policy is less certain for the large corporations to which no clear
rules apply because of the differences in the theories that protect one or
another group of employees from having the lawyer-client privilege ap-
ply to them.82 Moreover, since the policy is clearly a utilitarian one, the
more issues become public ones, the harder it is to justify allowing the
privilege to prevent the full truth from being obtained.
3
Whether or not there is less justification for the lawyer-client privi-
lege in entity representation, and thus less justification for the ethical
norm of confidentiality, it may be assumed that a government official
would be somewhat "chilled" by the knowledge that his disclosures
may not always be confidential. These disclosures may, in fact, not
only be made to superior officials, but also in some cases to law-en-
forcement officers or even to the public. Presumably, this chilling effect
on the official increases the more the lawyer himself is freed from any
strictures of confidentiality. The tradeoff, of course, is that an inflexible
rule may permit the cover-up of serious, illegal conduct in matters of
public concern. Although this is a policy question of some magnitude,
my guess is that, in light of Watergate, there has to be an opportunity
for lawyer disclosure. The opposite result would be unacceptable.
Whistleblowers have had a notoriously difficult time holding their jobs
after public disclosures of government corruption,8 4 but they still wear
the mantle of hero or patriot to most of the citizenry, even if the inter-
nal squeeze is often diametrically opposed to the public good." In
light of this phenomenon, it ought to be made clear that government
lawyers cannot hide behind the ethics of the profession in maintaining
80. J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2291, at 543 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961); see H. DRINKER,
supra note 1, at 132; M. FREEDMAN, supra note 10, at 4-5; Lawry, supra note 61, at 666-69.
81. Note, The Attorney.Client Privilege: Fixed Rules, Balancing, and Constitutional
Entitlement, 91 HARV. L. REv. 464, 473-77 (1977).
82. Id. The Board of Directors may also determine after the fact that all lawyer-client confi-
dences shall be waived for all corporate officers. A recent example of this is the decision by Gulf
to allow one of its lawyers to testify before a grand jury concerning conversations the lawyer had
with Gulf officials about bribes and pay-offs. See Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 1976, at 5, col. 2; Jan. 13,
1976, at 40, col. 1; Jan. 15, 1976, at I, col. 6.
83. Note, supra note 81, at 477.
84. See WHISTLE BLOWING 39-179 (R. Nader, R. Petkas & K. Blackwell eds. 1972).
85. The most famous case is that of Ernest Fitzgerald. See id. at 39-54.
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silence about known illegalities.86
The problem, I take it, is basically with the word "should" that
Dean Redlich uses in discussing his police officer case.87 The Code of
Professional Responsibility is already an intriguing document because
of its unsteady mixture of "shoulds," "mays" and "musts."88 The ethi-
cal considerations are supposed to contain "shoulds," that is, provisions
that urge the lawyer to higher standards of behavior. The disciplinary
rules are mandatory, but contain quite a few provisions that give law-
yers the option of behaving in one way or another.89 Canon 4 abso-
lutely forbids disclosures of the client's confidences and secrets, but
allows four exceptions.9" Those exceptions, broadly worded, are all
"mays." The lawyer may disclose a client's intent to commit a crime,
but he does not have to.9 ' A lawyer may disclose a client's confidences
when "required by law or court order," but he does not have to.92 The
reason the Code is drafted in this way is that a strong presumption
exists in favor of nondisclosure. There are cases, however, in which a
competing policy would seem to be so strong that the lawyer should
weigh everything in the balance before deciding whether to disclose.
The Code should offer no artificial protection in cases that present the
lawyer with this hard but important choice. Take the case of the future
crime exception, for example. In Florida the language has been
changed to make disclosure mandatory.93 Under pain of disciplinary
sanction, therefore, the Florida lawyer has to disclose "the intention of
his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent
the crime."9 4 But what if the crime is a relatively harmless misde-
meanor, like putting a slug in a parking meter?95 Or what if the lawyer
86. The point is simply that lawyers ought not to be able to justify failures to disclose illegali-
ties because of alleged professional ethics. The justification must be personal, although it can
obviously be made as a principled decision based on the individual's own conception of what is in
the public interest.
87. THE MURKY DIVIDE, supra note 50, at 97; see text accompanying notes 72-76 supra.
88. Each of the axiomatic canons contain the word "should." Provisions such as DR 7-102
all contain the obligatory word "shall." Each exception to the obligatory "shall" language of DR
4-101(B) is a permissive "may." DR 4-101(C).
89. In addition to DR 4-101(C), see DR 2-110(C), which deals with permissive withdrawals,
DR 5-105(C), which deals with conflicts of interest, and DR 7-101(B), which deals with limitations
on zealousness.
90. See note 67 supra.
91. DR 4-101(C)(3).
92. DR 4-101(C)(2).
93. See A. KAUFMAN, supra note 16, at 115.
94. Florida Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 4-101(D)(2), FLA. STAT. ANN. rules
(Harrison 1977).
95. The example is loosely drawn from A. KAUFMAN, supra note 16, at 113.
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is not certain or wants to try to talk the client out of committing the
deed? Surely there is good sense in allowing the lawyer some freedom
ethically to try to do the best thing under all the circumstances. Just as
surely, a statement should be included that the lawyer is not ethically
constrained from trying to prevent a future serious harm.
My answer to the confidentiality question for the government law-
yer is therefore (and not coincidentally) consistent with the present
framework of the exceptions to confidentiality under canon 4. Thus, if
the present format of the Code is maintained, I would suggest the fol-
lowing amendment to canon 4, which would become a new provision,
DR 4-1O(C)(5):
When employed as a government lawyer, any information that re-
lates to illegal conduct by any public official in connection with any
public matter or that relates to irregularities or illegalities reasonably
believed to have occurred, to be occurring, or yet to occur in connec-
tion with any public matter, may be disclosed by the government
lawyer to appropriate law-enforcement officials for action in the pub-
lic interest.
If the appropriate law-enforcement officials fail to act upon the mat-
ter iil a way reasonably consistent with the public interest, the gov-
ernment lawyer may disclose the information to the press or to
whomever else he reasonably believes will be able to act upon the
matter in a way that will be beneficial to the public interest.
In order to make this amendment work within the language of ca-
non 4, the words "client" and "government lawyer" would have to be
defined. New definitions, to be numbered (9) and (10) under the pres-
ent Code structure, could read like this:
(9) A government lawyer is a lawyer who is employed by any gov-
ernment or any agency or department thereof, or by any public or
quasi-public body, and who is acting in the capacity of a lawyer on
behalf of his employer.
(10) The client for the federal government lawyer is the head of the
agency or department or the head of the public or quasi-public body
to which the lawyer is currently attached under appropriate govern-
mental organizational practices or rules.
This definition of client would allow the government lawyer to dis-
close any information to the head of his department or agency on any
matter. I do not think it useful to attempt to limit the range of confi-
dential matters to officials lower than this, although there is no doubt
that the same "chilling effect" is possible at all administrative levels. It
seems to me that a rather free-wheeling discussion ought to be allowed
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within the agency itself; and the top official ought to be the one to de-
cide whether nonillegal matters go further. I realize this places the
questions of fairness and justice in the hands of the head of the agency,
not with the lawyer. I see no way a rule could be administered if these
questions were also left to the lawyer. It is here that resignation be-
comes the only alternative. Since, however, these fundamental ques-
tions may not be aired under the present constraints, perhaps a rule
indicating that the lawyer may disclose confidences concerning policy
matters may be appropriate after he terminates his employment with
the government. I may well support such a rule, but I would want to
have a caveat to prevent such disclosure "while a matter is pending."
There are questions of efficiency and responsibility here that seem to
me to outweigh the need for immediate revelation of what are obvi-
ously matters upon which reasonable minds could differ.
IV
As an ABA blue-ribbon panel embarks upon the task of revising
or rewriting the Code of Professional Responsibility, it must ask itself
fundamental questions. One such question has been addressed in this
article: How far shall the limits of confidentiality extend for the govern-
ment lawyer? Before this question can be answered, a reappraisal of
the concepts of client and of confidentiality must be undertaken. How-
ever much these two concepts are necessarily yoked together within the
traditional context of a single private attorney and a single readily
identifiable human client, the automatic application of these concepts
to entity representation is unworkable. To attempt to make such an
application is to be led into confusion by an unconscious assumption
concerning the meaning of the word client. In representing an entity,
the client may be one person or group for purposes of taking orders,
another for determining the interests to be served, and still another for
purposes of determining whose confidences ought to be respected. The
problem is compounded for the government lawyer because, as a pub-
lic official, he seems to have a special obligation to every citizen that is
very different from that which an ordinary lawyer has in serving a pri-
vate client.
My suggested changes in the Code solve only the most immediate
problem, a problem brought about by prior conceptual confusions and
unconscious assumptions; it is a problem that must be solved in light of
the present, apparently widely shared policy agreement that no govern-
ment lawyer should be deemed to be acting unethically if he chooses to
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divulge information concerning illegalities in the performance of the
public's business.
Presently, canon 4 is irrelevant to the government lawyer; conse-
quently, amendments such as those suggested in this article are abso-
lutely necessary, whether the Code is otherwise altered or not. My
hope, however, is that my suggestions will spur others to engage in
some fundamental rethinking of the conceptual framework of the
Code. If this is done, I am convinced that detailed rules will be found
necessary to govern the behaviors of different kinds of lawyers engag-
ing in different kinds of practices for vastly different kinds of clients.
